Abstract. We consider the problem of non-interactive message authentication using two channels: an insecure broadband channel and an authenticated narrow-band channel. This problem has been considered in the context of ad hoc networks, where it is assumed that there is neither a secret key shared among the two parties, nor a public-key infrastructure in place. We present a formal framework for protocols of this type, along with a new protocol which is as efficient as the best previous protocols. The security of our protocol is based on a new property of hash functions that we introduce, which we name "hybrid-collision resistance".
Introduction
The problem of authentication is of fundamental importance in cryptography.
Entity authentication and message authentication are two important aspects of secure communication. Typically, communicating parties would like to be assured of the authenticity of information they obtain via potentially insecure channels, as well as the identity of the sender.
There are many approaches to achieving these goals in standard models of publickey cryptography and secret-key cryptography. However, in ad hoc networks, traditional settings for cryptography may not be appropriate, for various reasons. For Boyar and Kuntz [2] , which is based on the discrete logarithm problem, and (2) a scheme proposed by Catalano et al [3] based on Paillier's trapdoor permutation [8] .
In the schemes proposed in [9] , the key K p is of size N 2 + N , where the message has size N . Thus K p could be a rather long key, which must be authenticated in a manner similar to a public key. Furthermore, the commitment schemes have a somewhat complicated structure, especially when compared to other NIMAPs that just use hash functions, for example.
Another recent paper, by Naor, Segev and Smith [7] , investigates two-channel authentication in the interactive setting. They achieve unconditional security using evaluation of polynomials over finite fields. For every integer k, their IMAP allows the sender to authenticate an n-bit message in k rounds, such that the length of the authenticated string is about 2 log(1/ ) + 2 log (k−1) n + O(1). By setting k = log(n), the manually authenticated string is of length 2 log(1/ ). They conclude that the advantage of assuming computational security is to reduce the amount of information that needs to be authenticated from 2 log(1/ ) to log(1/ ), and not to reduce the number of rounds.
Our contributions.
We describe a formal model for NIMAPs using two channels, and analyze the attacks that can occur in this model. Our model allows offline attacks by an adversary, as well as replay attacks. This is a strong attack model, so a scheme that is proven secure in this model does not require authenticated channels that have any unusual properties.
We show that it is sufficient to consider only impersonation attacks in this model.
Security of NIMAPs can be reduced to a certain "binding game". This makes it
quite straightforward to analyze protocols in this model.
In preparation for the description of our protocol, we introduce the idea of "hybrid-collision resistant" (HCR) hash functions. After analyzing the HCR property in the random oracle setting, we construct a new NIMAP based on HCR hash functions. Our protocol has a very simple structure and does not require any long strings to be authenticated ahead of time. These properties make the protocol applicable in a wide variety of settings. We analyze the security and efficiency of our protocol and compare it to other protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 deal with the general framework for NIMAPs over two channels; Section 4 examines previously proposed NIMAPs; and Section 5 proposes a new NIMAP.
In Section 2, a general NIMAP using two channels, GNIMAP, is proposed. The GNIMAP provides the required formalism for NIMAPs over two channels. The attack model, i.e., adversarial goal and capabilities, is defined in Section 3. Further, a Binding Game is introduced and analyzed. Then, GNIMAP is proven to be secure given that the Binding Game is hard to win.
Section 4 is devoted to briefly examining the previous NIMAPs in the literature.
The security of three NIMAPs in our general model is analyzed. Further, the amount of information sent in order to achieve a certain level of security is noted.
In Section 5, we define Hybrid-Collision Resistance (HCR) for hash functions.
The HCR Game is introduced and is analyzed in order to better understand the hardness of finding Hybrid-Collisions. Moreover, a NIMAP, based on HCR hash functions, is proposed. We prove that our NIMAP is secure given that the HCR Game is hard to win. Furthermore, the simplicity of the structure and the amount of information sent over both channels is compared between our proposed NIMAP and the most secure NIMAP found in the literature.
Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
General Model
Assume that two channels are accessible for communication: an insecure broadband channel, denoted by →, and an authenticated narrow-band channel, denoted by ⇒. Communication over the narrow-band channel is usually more expensive and less accessible. Hence, the messages sent over the authenticated channel are ideally much shorter than those sent over the insecure channel.
We assume that the adversary cannot modify the information transmitted over the authenticated channel, i.e., data integrity is ensured in this channel. Moreover, these narrow-band channels are equipped with authenticating features such that the recipient of the information can be sure about who sent it. However, the adversary can replay a previous flow or remove it.
Now consider a non-interactive Message Authentication Protocol that employs both the authenticated and the insecure channel between a claimant Alice and a verifier Bob. All flows are initiated from Alice and there are a total of two flows, one over the insecure channel and the other over the authenticated channel. We note that there is no flow being initiated from Bob and as a result, the order in which these two flows are being sent over the channels does not matter. Moreover, all other scenarios of a non-interactive Message Authentication Protocol involving more than two flows can be reduced to this scenario. That is, we can simply combine the flows sent over each type of channel in a single flow. This is not the case in the interactive setting since the data sent by Alice may depend on some data sent by Bob in a previous flow, which makes both the order and number of flows important in analysis.
Let M be the space of messages. In a Message Authentication Protocol, the claimant Alice chooses a message M ∈ M and sends it to Bob using the protocol.
At the end, Bob either outputs (Alice, M ), where M ∈ M, or he rejects.
Consider a randomized algorithm split : M → M 1 × M 2 which takes any message M as input and maps it into a pair (m 1 , m 2 ), where m 1 is shorter than m 2 . The reverse procedure is carried out by a deterministic algorithm reconstruct :
which takes a pair (m 1 , m 2 ) and maps it into a message M ∈ M or a "reject" sign ⊥.
In order to employ the split and reconstruct algorithms in a Message Authentication Protocol, we need them to satisfy the following requirements: 
Analysis of the General Model
The correctness of the aforementioned GNIMAP is ensured by property (i 3.1. Attack Model. In the setting of message authentication protocols, the adversarial goal is to make Bob accept a message M along with the identity of Alice, when he was supposed to reject (that is, when the message M was never sent by Alice to Bob.) There are two main types of attacks to consider: impersonation attacks and substitution attacks.
In an impersonation attack, the attacker tries to convince Bob that a message M is sent from Alice, while in fact M was never sent from Alice and the session has been initiated by the adversary. Figure 3 depicts the impersonation attack in the setting of GNIMAP.
Note that according to our model, the adversary cannot modify the data sent over the authenticated channel, but he or she can replay them. Hence, the authenticated flow in an impersonation attack is a replay of a previous flow sent by Alice.
has sent m 1 in a previous flow If M ∈ M, then output (Alice, M ), reject otherwise. This ability of the adversary may not be considered in all models. We do consider it in our model since it makes the adversary stronger and results in a stronger model. Figure 4 illustrates a substitution attack against GNIMAP. One could dispute that since an attacker has to use a previous flow in an impersonation attack, the attack should no be called an "impersonation", and should be called a substitution; see for instance [5] . However, we believe that allowing the adversary to replay previous authenticated flows in an impersonation attack results in a stronger adversary and, ultimately, a stronger model. Moreover, despite the fact that the two attack scenarios are equivalent in the noninteractive setting, they result in two very different attack scenarios in the interactive setting, see for instance [6] .
We consider an adaptive chosen plain-text attack (ACPA) model in our general setting. Note that the ACPA model is very strong and desirable compared to other models. An adaptive chosen plain-text attack consists of two stages: an information gathering stage and a deception stage.
The model presumes that in the information gathering stage, the attacker has the capability to adaptively choose a number of arbitrary messages M i , and have Alice send them to Bob. The attacker then records the communication for further use.
He or she can choose the subsequent messages to be sent by Alice using the results of the messages already sent. The goal of this stage is to gradually reveal information about the unknown aspects of the system (e.g. the randomized split algorithm in our case.) In addition, we assume that the attacker has precomputing capabilities and is able to mount "dictionary"-type attacks. The information gathering stage of an attack against GNIMAP is depicted in Figure 5 . We use the term online complexity of an adversary to refer to the number q of messages sent by Alice to Bob during the information gathering stage. On the other hand, the term offline complexity is used to refer to the computational complexity T of an adversary.
The deception stage is were the attack occurs. That is, the adversary tries to achieve his or her goal by making Bob accept a message M along with the identity of Alice, when he was supposed to reject. The attack is either a substitution or an impersonation attack.
In case of a substitution attack, Alice is sending a pair (m 1 , m 2 ) to Bob. The adversary substitutes m 2 with m 2 and leaves m 1 untouched. Now let M be one of the messages sent by Alice in the information gathering stage. On the other hand, consider an impersonation attack were the adversary sends m 2 and replays m 1 . Given that M ∈ N , this impersonation attack is equivalent to the substitution attack that we started with. This fact is illustrated in Figure 6 . Hence, without loss of generality, we only consider impersonation attacks in the deception phase. Note that anyone can replay both flows of a previous conversation between Alice and Bob. In this case, Bob accepts a message that was previously sent by Alice.
However, this replay impersonation does not constitute an attack. In a successful attack, the adversary is required to replay the authenticated flow and change the information sent over the insecure channel. The first flow could be a replay of a previously transmitted first flow. However, the two flows of the attack should not be identical to a previous conversation of Alice and Bob, otherwise the "attack" is considered a replay.
3.2. Security. In this Section, we prove that GNIMAP is secure given the properties enumerated in Section 2 and under the attack model described in Section 3.1.
The proof is based on a reduction.
Associated to each attack, there are sets N and N , resulting from the information gathering stage, and a pair (m 1 , m 2 ), from the deception stage, according to our
The dashed box is taking place during the information gathering stage. In any successful attack, the adversary needs to replay the authenticated flow.
As a result, m 1 ∈ {n 11 , n 21 , . . . , n q1 }. That is m 1 = n i1 , for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
Without loss of generality, assume that i is the smallest index for which m 1 = n i1 .
Moreover, M / ∈ {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M q }, since otherwise the attack is only a replay and not a real attack.
We now formally prove that the GNIMAP is secure given that (split, reconstruct)
is (T, )-binding. That is, we reduce an adversary who can attack the GNIMAP with non-negligible probability to an adversary who wins the Binding game with non-negligible probability.
Eve Challenger Consider the game depicted in Figure 8 . We call this game the "GNIMAP Game". This is because, if Eve wins this game with probability , then the game translates into an attack against GNIMAP with success probability . Here, Eve is facing a challenger who is simulating both Alice and Bob. The game consists of q rounds of Eve sending messages M i and the challenger responding with (n i1 , n i2 ), where split(M i ) = (n i1 , n i2 ). These q rounds correspond to the information gathering phase of the attack. The last round is analogous to the deception phase where Eve sends her pair (m 1 , m 2 ). Eve wins the game if m 1 = n i1 , for some
Assuming that Eve wins this game with non-negligible probability, we can employ her in the Binding game of Figure 1 . Depicted in Figure 9 , Eve is playing against her GNIMAP Game Challenger, while Oscar is playing against his Binding Game Challenger. Oscar will use the results of the GNIMAP Game to win his Binding Game. He first chooses a random value j ∈ R {1, . . . , q}. Then, Eve will carry out her own attack against the GNIMAP Challenger. That is, Eve sends messages M t and receives n t1 and n t2 .
The responses, n t1 and n t2 , come from computing split(M t ), except when t = j. In the jth round, Oscar forwards M = M j to his challenger. The challenger responds with a pair (m 1 , m 2 ). Then, Oscar forwards n j1 = m 1 and n j2 = m 2 to Eve.
After q rounds, Eve chooses a message M and sends m 1 and m 2 . Note that for
Eve to win, m 1 = n i1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Oscar simply forwards m 2 to his challenger if j = i, and quits otherwise.
Note that from Eve's point of view, this game is no different than the game of Figure 8 .
Assuming that Eve wins her game with probability p, Oscar clearly wins his game with probability p/q. Hence, we have proved the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that there is a GNIMAP where the pair (split, reconstruct)
is (T, )-binding. In the ACPA model, any adversary against this GNIMAP with online complexity q and offline complexity T has a probability of success p at most q .
We note that our reduction is not tight. However, it is safe to assume that q ≤ 2 10 in manual authentication. 
Previous Non-interactive Message Authentication Protocols
In this Section, we first define the kind of hash functions that are going to come up in our discussion. Secondly, we briefly introduce the previous NIMAPs found in the literature. Then, the security of these protocols is analyzed with respect to our general model.
4.1.
Definitions. We use the following definitions of different types of hash functions in the rest of the paper.
A Collision Resistant Hash Functions, (CR) H, is a hash function where
it is hard to find distinct elements x and y such that H(x) = H(y). The pair (x, y) 2 The reduction in [9] is also not tight and they get the same probability of success, p/q. They also assume that q ≤ 2 10 .
is called a collision pair. For security purposes, the length of the hash value is required to be more than 160 bits. Otherwise, an adversary has a good chance of finding a collision pair using an offline birthday attack.
A Second-Preimage Resistant Hash Function, (SPR) H, is a hash function where given a value x, it is hard to find a value y, x = y, such that H(x) = H(y). In this case, the best known generic attack is the exhaustive search. Hence, the length of the hash value is required to be at least 80 bits.
An -Universal Hash Function Family, ( -UHFF) H is a collection of functions H K depending on a random key K, where Pr[H K (x) = H K (y)] ≤ for any two distinct values x and y.
We now briefly introduce three NIMAPs found in the literature. Figure 11 . If the adversary can mount the above attack efficiently, then this protocol fails to satisfy property (ii) of Section 2.
Alice
Eve Bob In [9] , an adversary attacking the NIMAP is reduced to an adversary who finds second-preimages or breaks the trapdoor of the commitments. To achieve security against an adversary with online complexity of 2 80 and q = 2 10 , they need to authenticate 100 bits. More details can be found in [9] .
There is always the issue of authenticity attached to public parameters such as K p . Hence, it possibly restricts the application of this NIMAP. Moreover, as discussed in the Introduction, we are trying to replace the use of any PKI by using NIMAPs. As a result, this protocol does not seem to be the optimal solution.
On the other hand, this NIMAP is based on the assumption that trapdoor commitment schemes exist, as well as SPR hash functions. This protocol satisfies the properties of Section 2.
A non-interactive Message Authentication Protocol using

Hybrid-Collision Resistant Hash Functions
In this Section, we first define Hybrid-Collision Resistance for hash functions. Furthermore, we call the pair (L, M K) a hybrid-collision. Note that if l 2 = 0, then HCR is equivalent to CR. On the other hand, HCR is very close to SPR when l 1 = 0. In fact, HCR is interpolating between CR and SPR. This suggests that finding hybrid-collisions is harder than collisions, but not harder than secondpreimages. We will investigate this matter in more detail in the next Section.
Oscar Challenger
l2 . In order to analyze the difficulty of the HCR Game, we find an upper bound on the probability of Oscar winning the HCR Game.
Let distinct random values X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X T be Oscar's inputs to the random oracle. Moreover, let the hybrid-collision be (L, M K). We write
where |K i | = l 2 and |M i | = l 1 , for all i = 1, . . . , T .
Let D denote the event that M K is equal to one of X 1 , ..., X T , and let E denote the event that M K collides with some X i (i.e. H(M K) = H(X i ) where The probability that H(M K) = H(X j ) for each j is 2 −k . Hence, the probability of occurrence of one collision is
We bound 2 as follows. Construct a graph G with V (G) and E(G), denoting the set of vertices and edges respectively, where
for any m and n, m = n, X m X n ∈ E(G) if and only if H(X m ) = H(X n ). Now
because K is a random bitstring of length l 2 .
Note that the maximum number of edges of G is of order T 2 /2. Furthermore, for any randomly chosen X m and X n , the probability that X m X n is an edge is 2 −k . Hence, the expected number of edges of G is 2 −k T 2 /2 = 2 2t−k−1 . In addition, the expected number of vertices of positive degree is at most 2 2t−k . As a result,
Now, we compute
Note that the length of the original message, l 1 , has no influence in the analysis in the random oracle model. However, once a concrete hash function is chosen, the amount of time it takes to compute a hash function is in proportion to the size of the input, and as a result, the size of the message will be a factor to consider. The shorter the messages are, the more hash function computations can be handled in a fixed amount of time.
In Section 5.4 we examine p, the overall success probability of the adversary,
given particular values for parameters k, t and l 2 . The above NIMAP is also depicted in Figure 15 . Clearly, this (split, reconstruct) satisfies the Property (i) of Section 2. That is, any message M can be uniquely recovered:
Next we need to show that our (split, reconstruct) satisfies the Property (ii) of Section 2 which says: It is computationally infeasible to find a message M such that given (m 1 , m 2 ), where split(M ) = (m 1 , m 2 ), one can efficiently find an m 2 ∈ M 2 \ {m 2 } so that reconstruct(m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ M with non-negligible probability.
We substitute for the split and reconstruct algorithms and restate the Binding Property for our NIMAP as follows:
It is computationally infeasible to find a message M , |M | = l 1 , such that given
This is implied from the assumption that the HCR Game is hard. Note that the binding property for our NIMAP translates to HCR Game being hard, but the opposite is not true and does not need to hold for our application. In other words, Oscar may win the HCR Game by finding a collision of the form (M K , M K),
with K = K . However, this collision does not constitute an attack against our NIMAP since the messages are the same. On the other hand, all instances of a successful attack against our NIMAP translate into a winning strategy against the HCR Game.
Assuming that H is a (T, )-HCRHF, we conclude that (split, reconstruct) of this NIMAP is (T, )-binding. Hence, we get the following Corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1.
Let H be a (T, )-HCRHF. Any adversary against the NIMAP of Figure 15 , with online complexity q and offline complexity T , has a probability of success p at most q .
Note that, we do not require any public parameters to be distributed ahead of time. One could argue that the description of the HCR hash function needs to be distributed in an authentic manner ahead of time. In practice, however, these protocols are going to use standard built-in hash functions which do not require any authentication of public parameters, which would be required for commitment schemes.
Our new protocol looks similar to the protocol of Figure 12 with the difference that K is moved from the authenticated channel to the broadband channel.
However, there are several differences. The underlying hash function security requirement is different, properties of the channels are different, and the resulting overall security of our protocol is different from those of MANA I and its NIMAP version depicted in Figure 12 .
In our protocol, 1 , which is the length of the messages being authenticated, is a fixed parameter. That is, our protocol only authenticates messages of fixed length.
However, note that M is being sent over the broadband channel and sending long messages over this channel is very cheap. As a result, we can set 1 large enough for the desired application, and pad short messages with zeros if necessary.
5.4. Parameter sizes. Let T = 2 t and q be the offline and online complexities respectively. That is, the adversary is allowed to use T hash computations and make Alice send q messages to Bob. Moreover, let H be a (T, )-HCRHF and let k be the size of H.
According to Corollary 1, an adversary attacking our proposed NIMAP, using T hash computations and q messages, has probability of success p ≤ q .
In [9] , Pasini and Vaudenay assume that q ≤ 2 10 and t ≤ 70. They also require the probability of success of the adversary against the protocol of Figure 13 be less that 2 −20 . For this to happen, one needs to authenticate 100 bits. That is k = 100.
Using the same parameters, q ≤ 2 10 , t ≤ 70, and k = 100 we obtain that ≈ 2 −30 + 2 40−l2 . In order to achieve the same level of security obtained in [9] , i.e.
p ≤ 2 −20 , we should have ≈ 2 −30 . Thus, if we let l 2 ≥ 100 in our protocol of Figure 15 , then we obtain the same level of security of the protocol of Figure 13 .
That is, the amount of information sent over the authenticated channel is the same as in the Pasini-Vaudenay protocol.
We can actually reduce the size of l 2 to 70 in expense of authenticating one more bit. That is, q ≤ 2 10 , t ≤ 70, k = 101, and l 2 = 70 achieves the same level of security p ≤ 2 −20 .
5.5.
Advantages of the proposed NIMAP. Our proposed NIMAP of Figure   15 benefits from a simple and easy to implement structure. It is based on a single assumption that HCR hash functions exist. We do not use any commitment scheme or require any public parameters available to users such as the CRS.
The amount of information sent over the authenticated channel is as low as the most secure NIMAP proposed so far, while achieving the same level of security.
In addition, the amount of information sent over the insecure channel is reduced significantly.
Conclusion
We assumed that there are two channels available for communication, one insecure broadband channel and one authenticated narrow-band channel. We produced the required formalism needed in a general model of non-interactive Message Authentication Protocols using these two channels. GNIMAP depicts a general noninteractive Message Authentication Protocol. We proved that GNIMAP is secure
given that a Binding Game is hard to win for an adversary with certain properties.
Theorem 1 summarizes the security result about GNIMAP.
Further, we examined the NIMAPs found in the literature. We discussed their security in our general model.
Last but not least, we proposed a particular NIMAP based on HCR hash functions. We proved that our proposed NIMAP is secure in the general model given that the HCR Game is hard to win.
Our proposed NIMAP, sends the same amount of information over the authenticated channel as the most secure NIMAP proposed so far, while achieving the same level of security. In comparison with this latter protocol, our NIMAP reduces the amount of information sent over the insecure channel significantly.
